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**PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

**Problem:** To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to the Production of National Intelligence.

**Discussion:**

1. NSC 50 calls for a small Estimates Division to draw upon and review the specialized intelligence production of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates (para. 3a). It also calls upon the IAC to discuss and approve national intelligence estimates with provision for dissenting opinions (para. 2a). Finally, it calls for special provisions to be made for prompt coordinated national intelligence estimates in crisis situations (para. 4a(3)).
2. The NSC action, as well as the Dulles Committee Report, reaffirms in definite terms the basic principles of the NSCID's with respect to the production of national intelligence. National intelligence is by definition interdepartmental, and is distinguished by a substantive overlap between more than one field of departmental interests as allocated. It does not become national intelligence merely because it is of national interest, or because it is in response to a request by an interdepartmental body.
3. The NSCID's prescribe that national intelligence be composed to the maximum extent possible of departmental contributions of finished intelligence. This would require that CIA estimates, to a greater extent than is now the case, be discussed and planned at the earliest stage with appropriate collaborating departments, and, subject to the review responsibility of CIA, in the normal course be composed of texts contributed by the agencies. This would properly result in the discontinuance of duplicative research and report writing by CIA, with presumably economy of staff allocated to this function.
4. The effectiveness of participation by IAC in the production of national estimates will depend heavily upon the selection of matters appropriate for consideration. Presumably the authority of the IAC in such participation can be delegated to subordinate groups. Nevertheless, the IAC must stand ready to consult and pass on any questions of substance on which there is not general agreement, or on which any member requests consideration.

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5. The special procedures required in crisis situations will need to be worked out in some detail for subsequent consideration by the IAC. In any event, these procedures should be based upon the same considerations of departmental responsibility and consultation at all stages as apply to all national intelligence estimates.

Recommendations:

1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
  - a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;
  - b. That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;
  - c. That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate agencies.
2. That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member.
3. That ICAPC review and make recommendations for any revision of procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with the principles outlined in existing NSCID's, NSC 50, and Recommendation 1 above.

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III

**RESEARCH AND REPORTS**

**Problem:** To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to the Responsibility for Research and Reports.

**Discussion:**

1. The NSC 50 states that in CIA there has been a confusion between national intelligence and miscellaneous research and reporting, and that while NSCID's on this subject are sound, they have not been effectively carried out (para. 5a). It also states that out of the present CIA there should be created (a) a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the interdepartmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates, and (b) a Research and Reports Division to accomplish research in and coordinate production of intelligence in recognized fields of common interest.

**Recommendation:**

1. That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC.
2. That, on a priority basis, ICAPU prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern.

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IV

**POLITICAL SUMMARIES**

**Problem:** To Implement SEC 50 with Respect to Political Summaries.

**Misception:**

1. SEC 50 states that consideration should be given to a proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries (para. 4a (4)).
2. The preparation of political summaries, daily and weekly, presents a difficult problem involving the dissemination of information which is in part intelligence and in part operational. It also involves the responsibilities of each agency to distribute information which pertains to its responsibilities or stems from its sources.

**Recommendation:**

1. That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly.

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